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Introduction
In the fall of 2020, the Trump administration issued dual executive orders designed to
effectively ban TikTok and WeChat from operating in the United States, at least in their
current forms. In January 2021 it did the same with respect to Alipay and seven other
Chinese-owned apps. These actions came against the background of years of executive
orders and rules aimed at limiting the reach of China-based technology firms. Each of these
actions was based, in significant part, on assertions of national security. Going forward, the
US government has an urgent need for smart policies and practices to respond to China’s
growing tech sector and the spread of China-controlled platforms. The Biden administration
will have to decide what to do about TikTok and WeChat. It also will need to develop a
broader US strategy for addressing the range of security risks (e.g., economic, national
security, cybersecurity) and threats to civil liberties posed by the spread of
China-developed and -controlled technologies.
This report seeks to contribute to these efforts by suggesting a comprehensive
framework for understanding and assessing the risks posed by Chinese technology
platforms in the United States. It is the product of a working group convened by the
Tech, Law & Security Program at American University Washington College of Law and
the National Security, Technology, and Law Working Group at the Hoover Institution
at Stanford University. The signatories to this report come to this issue with different
perspectives and different backgrounds. But we share a common view—one reflected in
numerous reports and publicly available threat assessments—that China’s power is growing,
that a large part of that power is in the digital sphere, and that China can and will wield
that power in ways that adversely affect our national security.1 And we assess that it will
do so in novel ways that implicate numerous interests not traditionally associated with
national security, such as data privacy, freedom of speech, and economic competitiveness.
That said, we also recognize that not all such threats are equal. Actions with respect to
Huawei, federal bans on the use of Chinese-manufactured drones, the executive orders
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targeting TikTok and WeChat, and recently suggested prohibitions on US companies
doing business with foreign-owned cloud infrastructure all assert general risk to national
security as a justification.2 But the specific threats and risks posed by each of these
unique technologies vary. The collateral costs and impacts of these actions differ. And the
possibilities of effective mitigation measures to minimize both the risks and the collateral
consequences differ as well.
The primary goal of this report is to frame, assess, and disaggregate the various national
security risks associated with one specific aspect of this threat: China’s ownership and control
over communication platforms and other technologies used in the United States. An effective
policy must start with a targeted understanding of the nature of risks and an assessment of
the impact US measures will have on national security and competitiveness. To be clear, we
lack sufficient information—and do not attempt—to accurately quantify the seriousness
of the specific risks. Rather, our goal here is to analyze the various threats, put them into
context, and offer a framework for assessing proposed responses in ways that we hope can
aid those doing the risk analysis in individual cases. Moreover, while we focus this paper on
communications platforms, we hope and expect the analysis to be useful in other areas.

The Strategic Landscape and Broader State of Play
To set the scene for the discussion, this section lays out the broader strategic landscape
between the United States and China with respect to Chinese digital platforms and
influence overseas.

The growing power of Chinese tech companies and the Chinese system Chinese technology
firms are growing more competitive internationally. Chinese firms benefit from state
subsidies and protectionist policies domestically, helping enable their global expansion. At
the same time, the firms have shown real innovation and commercial prowess in ways that
have also contributed to their global competitiveness. Of particular note, Chinese-owned
apps integrate social media, financial, personal, and business functions in ways that are
unknown in the West. This kind of integration is promoted by the Chinese government.
It provides the government unprecedented access to information as well as a means to
control and censor. It also is prized by consumers for the convenience offered by connected
applications.
Meanwhile, the Chinese government pursues an increasingly assertive foreign policy that,
among other objectives, seeks to advance an authoritarian capitalist model of governance
that could threaten support for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The
US intelligence community’s 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment described this as a coming
ideological battle with the United States.3 Beijing also leverages internet and emerging
technologies to increase its foothold in technological systems around the world. Given the
Chinese government’s relationship to the Chinese technology sector, this leverage raises
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concerns about China’s ability to access data, engage in malicious influence operations
abroad, and launch cyber-enabled attacks. These concerns apply to data stored outside of
China’s borders, even if held by companies incorporated in China, and to data held by
foreign firms that have servers within Chinese borders.
Beijing’s relationship to the Chinese technology sector is also evidenced in the government’s
concerning efforts to shift technical standards and internet protocol development (e.g., the
pushing of a New Internet Protocol proposal) from open, multistakeholder bodies, to
more state-controlled venues that would allow Beijing to promote standards that advantage
Chinese firms.4 There is also a concern that broader Chinese dominance in critical
communications technologies like 5G presents both economic and national security risks to
the United States.
It also is important to stress that “China” is not a monolith. There is friction within the
Chinese system itself. Technology firms can push back—and they have done that in
the past—against Chinese government data access requests in select cases. As a result,
the Chinese government’s ability to access data may not be as capacious as often
depicted in United States commentary. There is also real debate within China about
privacy as well as efforts to impose data collection limits on private firms. That said,
President Xi Jinping’s China has reportedly put an end to the earlier period of “reform and
opening,” reversing liberalization efforts in law and government and in some instances
asserting extraordinary controls on some of China’s best known e-commerce firms. And the
system lacks checks and balances, oversight, and clear ways for individuals or companies to
contest the Chinese government’s technology and data access decisions.

Internet governance battle Rather than working with allies to build a coherent system
for regulating the internet, the United States is in many respects at odds with key allies
and partners around the world. This can, in part, be linked to the Trump administration’s
impact on diplomatic relationships. But other structural challenges—such as divergence
on privacy and speech policy between the United States and the European Union—persist.
As a result, in Europe and in many other parts of the world, governments and the public at
times make a false equivalency between the US and Chinese internet governance systems.
They sometimes point, for example, to the US system of foreign intelligence collection as a
violation of their citizens’ rights and interests and suggest that it is equivalent to the ways in
which China gathers data and conducts surveillance.

Chinese online threat The US intelligence community assesses that China is engaged in
active, ongoing cyberespionage against the United States.5 This is underscored by numerous
reports and indictments of cyber-enabled trade secret theft in recent years.6 The intelligence
community also assesses that China presents a growing threat of offensive cyber operations
against our core military and critical infrastructure systems and is expanding its ability to
engage in influence operations against the United States and its citizens.
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National security shift Foreign intelligence collection and espionage are evolving
with the growing digitization of society. Technological embeddedness and diffusion
(e.g., smartphone apps, facial recognition cameras, the Internet of Things) have opened up
the possibility of new and broader vectors of data collection on individuals or populations
without the same kind or degree of resource limitations of the past.
There is also a risk that anyone or any device or system—irrespective of country of origin—
could become a threat vector. Every piece of software or hardware has vulnerabilities that
can be exploited. Every piece of software or hardware may also produce vulnerabilities
in its interaction with other systems and devices. And with a globally entangled digital
supply chain, compromises of one system can further expose many others to subsequent
compromise, as was recently seen in the case of the SolarWinds compromise. As a result, the
US homeland and its connected infrastructure on American soil are at risk in distinctly new
ways, not just through vulnerabilities in devices but through greater consumer dependence
on global goods as well.

Privacy and cybersecurity failures Pervasive data collection also enables a range of actors—
including, potentially, a foreign adversary like the Chinese government—to access large
quantities of data. This creates significant risks, as increasingly sophisticated and powerful
analytics can discover highly granular information about particular individual or group
attributes and behavior via analysis of this data. Among other concerns, this can be used for
identity exploitation, influence, and control. The ability to collect stems from several factors
including the private sector’s mass data collection, weak cybersecurity practices by many
companies, and the absence of effective data privacy protections in many countries around
the world, notably including the United States. The lack of sufficient market incentives for
private companies to invest in robust (and often basic) cybersecurity measures also harms
national security with respect to data confidentiality.

Trade issues On top of all this, there is an ongoing trade battle between Washington and
Beijing that is based in part on protectionist interests related to technology firms as well as
a strategic goal of ensuring technological dominance on a global scale. These trade issues are
increasingly intertwined with national security issues. The Trump administration’s export
controls on US technology going to Chinese telecom Huawei—made under the claim
of national security risk but done with broad impacts on trade—are one such example.7
Future regulation of technologies for security reasons will have broad strategic implications
for global trade as well. Economic and national security risks are, as a result, becoming
increasingly entangled.

Nature of Risks Associated with Data Access and Infiltration by Foreign Technology
Distinct, and often significant, national security risks are at play with respect to China’s
access to data and control over technologies relied on by Americans. These risks are often
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grouped together in ways that blur their discrete aspects. It is thus important to specify the
nature of the risks so as to ensure targeted, tailored responses that account for ripple effects
on US security and prosperity and increase public confidence in the decision to respond.

Access to data The national security risks associated with access to data about national
security secrets, such as core military capabilities or nuclear weapons, are widely recognized
and significant. Access to data about (or technology used by) others, including those
civilians who do not work in government, the defense industrial base, sensitive technology
sectors, or on other parts of the critical infrastructure, creates national security risks that
may not be as intuitive. Such information can be collected and aggregated, without the
resource limitations of the past, in ways that create new national security risks, even if the
particular topic of information collected is not, on its face, related to national security.
First, a national security threat arises if and when an individual or organization is
connected with, is linked to, or becomes the person with digital keys to valued sources of
information, such as critical infrastructure or governmental secrets. That individual and his
or her connected systems and devices are all potential vectors for a malicious actor to gain
access to sensitive data and systems (such as through email phishing to trick an individual
or targeted network attacks that collect internet data in transit).
Second, as one learns more about an individual’s or group’s interests, thought processes,
and the like, that individual or group could become a target—or potentially an asset—
in an information or espionage campaign. This in turn can increase the effectiveness
of both human intelligence and digital influence operations. One can, for example,
imagine an influence campaign that identifies and targets American institutions with the
aim of increasing the potency of Chinese messaging or undermining the willpower of
US decision makers to advance US initiatives deemed contrary to the interest of the Chinese
government.
Third, even if the particular individual is not a valuable source or target, his or her data
can be combined with others—thus becoming a data point that subsequently enables an
actor to carry out better targeting, analysis, or artificial intelligence development. The vastly
expanding capabilities to combine disparate data sets and correlate information to identify
individuals mean that the security risks of a particular data set are no longer confined just
to the substance of the data itself. They include the data sets with which it can be combined.
In that vein, as several experts have suggested, the aggregation of data in itself has potential
intelligence value, even if the collection is not focused on any specific target. It enables
a foreign adversary like China to glean valuable information about patterns of behavior,
interests, and predispositions that could in turn be used to inform future intelligence, cyber,
and information operations and, potentially, to better train artificial intelligence algorithms.
That said, at some point access to additional data may have diminishing returns, such that
adding more information will not add much more value for the actor.
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Fourth, national security and economic risks intersect. The aggregation of immense
data sets by a Chinese firm like ByteDance, for example, could help further the expansion
of Chinese technology companies globally. Large data sets also drive AI technical
development—and greater access therefore means greater likelihood of success, all other
things being equal. These factors can further China’s economic strength, intelligence
exploitation, and cyber and influence campaigns.8
In sum, the ability of foreign actors to aggregate large volumes of data is a growing security
threat, but it is important to put each case in context.

Influence operations China effectively controls its domestic information environment
and has been expanding its capability to shape the information environment abroad.
Chinese technology platforms potentially provide ways in which access to communications
systems becomes an easy means to manipulate users. Thus far, Beijing primarily conducts
influence operations to gather strategic intelligence about US policies and personnel, to
acquire technology from industrial espionage targets, and to influence and shape the
public narrative overseas related to Chinese domestic issues such as Hong Kong’s autonomy
and human rights abuses in Xinjiang.9 In the future, it is possible that Chinese influence
operations could target democratic institutions or sow panic in moments of crisis as well,
further implicating national security. Already, Beijing has used influence operations during
the COVID-19 pandemic to spread disinformation about the virus.

Attack vectors China could leverage access to networks and individual devices such as
smartphones to conduct malicious cyber operations. Intrusions into digital infrastructure
or preexisting footholds in that infrastructure (e.g., concerns about Huawei 5G) could
enable China to gather information; disrupt the speed, reliability, or other functionality of
systems and devices; or cause physical damage through those systems. This kind of sabotage
can be uniquely damaging but difficult to detect. Poor security practices in technological
standards and protocols—weaknesses in the communication rules used by different systems
and devices—exacerbate these risks.

Case-Based Analysis for Individual Cases: Necessity and Proportionality
The US government needs a framework for deciding whether, in what circumstances,
and how to take action with respect to Chinese-manufactured, -owned, or -controlled
communications technology and systems that may pose security risks to the United States.
The diffuseness, indirectness, and interconnectedness of digital threats make this
consideration of collateral consequences all the more important.
Once all data collection is defined as a national security threat, then just about everything
in the digital realm is a national security threat. The challenge is figuring out the risk
posed in different contexts (including a nuanced assessment of the kind of collection one
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is concerned about, by whom, and why it poses a threat), the tolerance for those risks,
and available mitigation measures. This challenge requires a consistent and principled
balancing approach to vetting and assessing risk posed by collection activities as well as the
costs incurred by planned responses to such activities. It involves assessing the nature and
weight to be accorded to the particular threat and subsequently balancing the mitigation
of said threat against the nature and weight of a chosen response’s potential collateral
consequences.
A necessity and proportionality framework helps with this analysis. This framework
involves balancing the need to act against the various costs of doing so. It helps decision
makers analyze whether and in what circumstances mitigation measures can help alleviate
the national security risks identified. Several components and variables are involved
in identifying whether a particular technology presents a national security risk. It is
not within the scope of this effort or within the capability of this group to make those
determinations with respect to any particular technology or platform with any reasonably
certain degree of accuracy. This report instead offers a framework for evaluating such risk.

1. Proper Identification of Risk
Step one is to accurately frame the threat’s nature, its directness, the degree to which it
is likely to manifest, and its relative immediacy, among other factors. The risks posed by
threats directed against core military or other traditional national security concerns are
obvious. The risk, however, diminishes where the threat is based on general data collection
considerations, which are more uncertain and diffuse. These general data collection
concerns are of two distinct varieties: concerns about the collection of data regarding
the operation (and perhaps vulnerability) of critical infrastructure systems; and similar
concerns about broader collection related to consumers and their behavior. When talking
about the threat posed by access to data from communications platforms and apps, it is also
critical to assess whether and to what extent the data provides additional value beyond what
is available to China via scraping of publicly available data sources, purchasing from data
brokers, illegal theft, or other alternative mechanisms of acquiring the data.

2. Assessment of Collateral Consequences
Step two is to delineate and assess collateral consequences. Risk mitigation measures should
be proportionate to the assessed need to act. Within this framework, the proportionality
analysis should take into account the potential collateral consequences to the United States,
its partners, its allies, and its citizens. Such policies should also include clear red lines for
determining when the negative collateral impacts are deemed disproportionate to the need
or otherwise unacceptable. The United States should at all times be wary of actions that give
authoritarian regimes rhetorical ammunition to defend their own policies and establish
dangerous precedents for other countries to do the same.
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Depending on the technology or platform at issue, these collateral concerns might include,
but are not limited to, negative impacts on:

Individual rights Information controls on internet traffic or internet companies could
stifle speech and association in ways that undercut individual rights, as demonstrated
by a court ruling that found the Trump administration’s WeChat “ban” violated the
First Amendment.10 Such controls also could undermine important freedoms that do not
receive First Amendment protection. Regulation could also collaterally impact individuals’
ability to associate, organize, and assemble in the modern age. The WeChat executive order
was a similar manifestation of this problem, as it would, if put into effect, have blocked many
American users from interacting with friends, family, and business partners located in China.
More generally, it is critical that US mitigation measures should account for America’s values
and commitments, including its commitment to diversity as a nation of immigrants.

Economic competitiveness and innovation Much of the world looks to the United States
as a global leader on technology policy. Yet US technology is also, for many, something to
be feared, or at least critiqued. There is, as a result, a significant risk that US bans based on
foreign ownership will come back to haunt American companies. Already, many countries
are levying restrictions on their digital markets and raising digital trade barriers to foreign
firms. American businesses will suffer if it becomes an increasingly common, accepted
practice to kick out apps and other services based on the fact that they are foreign-owned.
Restricting transactions between US and Chinese companies may also lead to American
companies getting shut out of markets where those Chinese companies operate, thereby
ceding ground to Chinese or other companies to provide those services instead.
Meanwhile, severing or modulating rich, free-flowing connectivity among diverse pools
of perspective, talent, and research will almost certainly create headwinds to innovation.
This will affect productivity, thereby reducing the size of the economic pie, apart from how
shares within that pie are divvied up.

Security Some mitigation measures will likely drive individual users to alternative social
media and communications platforms. Proposed mitigation measures should take into
account the potential for damaging the US government’s ability to access communications
for legitimate intelligence purposes. For similar reasons, there may be a benefit in
encouraging, rather than discouraging (or prohibiting), such entities from using US-based
cloud providers.

3. Assessment of Mitigation Measures
Finally, step three is to assess measures that might mitigate the risks identified. Possible
measures include:
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Restricting access Key considerations include the following: where the data is stored,
how the data is stored (e.g, is it encrypted?), where and how the data is transmitted,
who within the company can access it, who from any third-party suppliers or
subcontractors can access it, and whether the adversary government has any formal or
informal access. These also include technological considerations as well as logistical and
ownership questions (e.g., who provides cloud storage and what rules is that provider
bound by?).

Audits and reviews Effective audits and reviews can minimize and identify national
security risks. The United Kingdom has instituted (and has recently planned to
expand) a testing and evaluation center for 5G telecommunications equipment that
probes for security vulnerabilities and assesses security risk. The Cyberspace Solarium
Commission’s supply chain report recommends better product testing in the United States
to promote stronger security across the broader digital supply chain.11 Audits and reviews
should be similarly imposed on particular entities and technologies that carry national
security risks.

Broad Policy Responses
In addition to creating a proportionality framework to identify and respond to particular
risks, the United States needs to adopt a range of broad policy responses to strengthen its
defenses, support our economy, minimize the risk that might otherwise be posed by any
particular actor or entity, and build alliances that promote a safe and secure internet while
protecting core values. These broad policy responses are a key part of the solution. They
shift the backdrop against which individual cases are assessed.

Stronger cybersecurity Improving overall cybersecurity defenses across all sectors of
society would help provide needed protection against the aforementioned threats as well (of
course) as many others. Stronger cybersecurity protections at home would introduce barriers
and friction to China’s ability to exploit the cyber environment to its strategic advantage.
Securing digital systems and infrastructure would have broader benefits as well, helping
to protect against an array of different threats. The SolarWinds incident is just the latest
demonstration of the importance of bolstering security in a globally interconnected digital
supply chain.
Other elements of strong cybersecurity include the development of better means to track,
detect, and proactively defend particular systems of interest—something that is largely a
human-based endeavor, albeit aided by technology. In addition, there is a need to leverage
coalitions (e.g., international, private-public) across the connected fabric of cyberspace so
that China is required to defeat a coalition rather than picking off one unlucky victim at a
time.
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Privacy legislation Placing better controls on data collection, sale, and aggregation by
private companies would help ensure better data security. In turn, this would limit the
amount and type of data that foreign actors can exploit and the potential for malicious
actors (including foreign adversaries such as China) to engage in such activities as espionage
and disinformation campaigns. In particular, strong privacy legislation should include
limitations on data collection by private companies as well as limits on the data brokerage
industry, so as to restrict its buying and selling of information.

Clear risk-based framework for foreign apps As part of any policy on the security of all
software, the US government needs to be explicit about the alleged security risks posed by
foreign software and the requirements for addressing those risks. Clear criteria as to when
a foreign app poses a national security risk will help ensure consistency and stability of
enforcement.12 This should not mimic Beijing’s approach to “cyber sovereignty” but should
put in place an approach that establishes strong, generally applicable safeguards while
enabling data flows that meet those standards.

Policies for global cloud computing The United States should demand appropriate privacy
and security controls—such as those put forward by both the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)—on
cloud security standards.13 These standards help ensure the safe routing of data between
different locations around the world.

International engagement These challenges will not be solved purely through domestic
means. Three prongs of international engagement are vital to US success on these issues.
First, alliances: the United States should partner with key allies in the democratic world
to advance norms, standards, policies, and principles that support better cybersecurity,
better privacy, and preservation of a free, open, and secure internet. This should include
a particular focus on US-EU engagement.14 In addition, the United States should pursue
alliances with those within China’s geographic and influence orbit, including Japan,
South Korea, Singapore, India, and Australia.
Second, vision: the United States needs a stronger vision of internet governance that places
management of harm front and center, while also safeguarding core freedoms and resisting
authoritarian systems of surveillance and control.
And third, standards: a defining feature of Beijing’s approach to internet governance is
pursuing the replacement of open and interoperable internet standards with standards
designed to promote Chinese technology and a Chinese interpretation of economic and
national security. The US government has largely remained on the sidelines in this contest
(although US technology companies remain actively engaged) because of its historically
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hands-off approach to the internet and desire to not mimic Beijing’s state-heavy approach
to technology standards. It is time for Washington to carefully consider a renewed form of
engagement with standards bodies.

Investment in US industry Finally, the US government should invest intelligently in
American industry. The Cyberspace Solarium Commission, for instance, recommended in
its full report that the US government invest more in promoting cyber resilience to shift
market incentives.15 And its supply chain white paper recommended targeted infrastructure
investment to boost US competitiveness.16 These are valuable starting points.

Conclusion
The US response to the growing threat posed by China-controlled internet platforms
lacks coherence. The United States needs a clear, effective, and consistent strategy on
these issues. Such a strategy requires a clear-eyed view of the interconnected threats to our
economy, national security, and civil liberties posed by China; a comprehensive assessment
of the costs and benefits of proposed responses; and the building of structures, coalitions,
and international alliances that collectively resist authoritarian systems of control.
This paper seeks to contribute to that effort by providing a framework for assessing and
evaluating risk.
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